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Abstract: The issues of channel conflict and channel power have received widespread research attention, 
including Geylani et al.’s (2007) work on channel relations in an asymmetric retail setting. Specifically, 
these authors suggest that a manufacturer can respond to a dominant retailer’s pricing pressure by raising 
the wholesale price for a weak retailer over that for the dominant retailer while transferring demand to the 
weak retailer channel via cooperative advertising. But, is online expansion another kind of strategic 
manufacturer’s optimal response to a dominant retailer? In this paper, we extend this work by adding a 
direct online selling channel to illustrate the impact of the manufacturer’s internet entry on firms’ 
demands, profits, and pricing strategies and on consumer welfare. Our analysis thus includes a condition 
in which the manufacturer can add an online channel. If such an online channel is opened, the channel-
supported network externality willalways benefit the manufacturer but hurt the retailers. Consumers, 
however, will only benefit from the network externality when a dominant retailer is present and will be 
hurt when both retailers are symmetric. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Recently, there has been a considerable expansion of work devoted to examining the power of 
dominant retailers. One possible guide for investigating channel strategy in the presence of a 
dominant retailer is the theoretical model proposed by Geylani et al. (2007), which demonstrates 
that a strategic manufacturer can respond to a dominant retailer’s pricing pressures by raising the 
wholesale price for a weak retailer while transferring demand to this weak retailer through joint 
promotions and advertising. In practice, we note that Procter & Gamble, perhaps the best 
example, sells its products either through dominant retailers like Wal-Mart or weak retailers like 
franchised retail stores. While doing so, the company is blazing a trail in direct online selling to 
improve interactions with consumers. In fact, in January 2012, a Procter & Gamble spokesperson 
told the Wall Street Journal that the consumer-packaged goods giant was looking at its new e-
Store (http://www.pgestore.com) pilot project as a ‘learning lab’ (Retail Wire, 2012). Likewise, 
Lung Nilfisk, one of the ten largest sellers of local cosmetics brands in China, is expanding to 
online markets while still selling products in traditional stores. This company, which formerly 
sold its 
  
 
products either in huge supermarkets like Wal-Mart or Carrefour or in small franchised retail 
stores, has been exploring new ways to create direct relationships with consumers since receiving 
its direct selling license in 2008. For instance, it now allows consumers to conveniently log into a 
member management system to search for their favourite products. In the personal computer 
market, the third largest US PC manufacturer, Gateway, also distributes its products both through 
its direct internet channel and through huge independent retailers like Best Buy and Costco (Yoo 
and Lee, 2011). Therefore, we propose a new question: is online expansion another kind of 
strategic manufacturer’s optimal response to a dominant retailer? 
 
When the focus is on direct internet selling, however, the unique highly interactive features of 
online shopping environments should never be ignored. See in Viswanathan (2005), the web 
possesses unique features that traditional channels for commerce lack – customisation; 
interactivity; multimedia abilities; global access unconstrained by time and space limitations; 
ability to access, store and transmit information inexpensively; and the ability to conduct 
transactions in real time. These technological capabilities such as interactivity and real-time 
communications have direct consequences for businesses as well as consumers. For example, 
firms like Amazon.com have leveraged their customer base to add value through user ratings, 
reviews and feedback. These user communities generate significant direct as well as indirect 
network externalities. The offline channel offers much less scope for such community building, 
and consequently, a much lower possibility for the creation of network externalities. When firms 
are making strategic decisions, especially about online selling, they must never neglect channel-
supported network externalities that may directly influence the equilibrium prices, market shares, 
and the profits of related firms (see Conner, 1995; Arthur, 1996; Haubl and Trifts, 2000; Bickart 
and Schindler, 2001; Basu et al., 2003; Asvanund et al., 2004; Viswanathan, 2005; Tomak and 
Keskin, 2008; Prasad et al., 2010; Tirunillai, 2011). 
 
Yet the literature on a manufacturer’s decision to introduce a direct online selling channel is 
scant, especially as it relates to online channel-supported network externalities and their impact  
on  manufacturer  and  retailers’  pricing  decisions  and  profit  levels  in the supply chain context 
outlined by Geylani et al. (2007). Our purpose in this paper, therefore, is to extend these authors’ 
work by examining the decision-making implications of a manufacturer’s direct internet entry 
when its downstream retailers are asymmetric and a channel-supported network externality exists 
in the online channel, a condition that, to our knowledge, has not previously received formal 
consideration. 
 
One aspect that has received widespread academic attention is dual channel management, which 
many studies have addressed in terms of the impact of a supplier or manufacturer’s direct internet 
encroachment on the profits and equilibriums of channel members (see Chiang et al., 2003; 
Cattani et al., 2004, 2006; Arya et al., 2006; Kumar and Ruan, 2006; Liu and Zhang, 2006; 
Dumrongsiri et al., 2008; Yoo and Lee, 2011; Xiong et al., 2012). We therefore ask the following 
questions: 
 Under what condition is it profitable for a supplier to engage in online selling, 
especially when the online channel has delayed positive network externalities? 
 What is the impact of the network externality in the online channel on the pricing 
strategies and profits of all firms? 
 How does channel power between a manufacturer and its retailer affect the 
competitive outcomes of the equilibriums? 
  
 
 
 What is the effect on consumers when the manufacturer engages in online selling? 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model together with 
its corresponding settings and assumptions.  This  section  also  provides the basic modelling 
framework and characterises the equilibriums that defines the manufacturer’s direct internet entry. 
Section 3 analyses the impact of asymmetric retailing costs on the manufacturer’s internet entry 
and the equilibriums. Section 4 shows the comparative analysis from the perspective of channel 
power and channel-supported network externality. Section 5 reveals the effect of manufacturer’s 
direct entry on consumer welfare. Section 6 concludes the paper and suggests directions for future 
research. All proofs are presented in the Appendix. 
 
 
2 The model 
 
2.1 Settings and assumptions 
The structure of the market under consideration consists of an upstream manufacturer supplying a 
(homogeneous) good to two competing retailers. As shown in Figure 1, in the model which is 
based on the same supply chain structure as used in Geylani et al. (2007), the manufacturer is 
unable to directly influence the wholesale price for the dominant retailer (Retailer 1) and the 
retailers are asymmetric. After the manufacturer’s direct internet entry, consumers can choose to 
shop either online or offline. 
 
Figure 1 The model (manufacturer’s direct entry when Retailer 1 behaves as a dominant retailer) 
 
P1 Pd P2 
 
 
0 1 
 
In line with previous studies, we assume that the two retailers are located at both ends of a 
Hotelling line bounded between zero and one, and that every consumer in the market makes either 
a one-unit purchase or none at all. All consumers are uniformly distributed along the line with a 
constant unit transportation cost of t, which, without loss of generality and as in most earlier 
research, we set to equal 1 (Pazgal and Soberman, 2007). We first assume that all retailers’ 
marginal cost of retailing is asymmetric and to be zero, and then investigate the impact of retailer 
cost asymmetry in Section 3 (Geylani et al., 2007). Based on the same assumptions as made by 
Liu and Zhang (2006), the manufacturer’s marginal cost for producing the product in question is 
zero. Each consumer’s reservation price is V and V > 4t to insure that the consumers’ utility is not 
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negative and the market is completely covered; that is, V > 4. If the manufacturer decides to open 
an online channel, the fixed cost for setting one up is F, and all consumers incur the same 
shopping cost s to purchase online, one that consists mainly of the cost to access the internet. We 
also  assume that the shopping  cost will never be too  large and  so let    s < 2t; that is, 0 < s < 2 
(Liu and Zhang, 2006). The utility of the consumers purchasing online is thus the same and 
independent of their locations. The basic parameters are given in Table 1. 
Table 1 Model parameters 
R1, R2, M Retailer 1, Retailer 2, and manufacturer 
p1, p2, pd The retail prices of the two retailers and the online price of the manufacturer 
w Wholesale prices set by the manufacturer 
x The location of marginal consumers for Ri and the online channel, i = 1, 2 
s Consumers’ online shopping cost 
F Fixed cost of setting up an online channel 
Market behaviour is characterised as a two-stage complete information game. In the first stage, 
the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and then, based on these levels, in the second stage, the 
two retailers compete in retail prices when the manufacturer has not opened an online channel. 
When a channel has been opened, we assume that in the second stage, the manufacturer is the 
price leader and sets its online selling price before the retailers (Liu and Zhang, 2006). 
 
2.2 Manufacturer’s direct entry 
2.2.1 Single-period problem 
We first analyse a single-period problem where consumers do not enjoy any benefit from network 
externalities and then expand it to a two-period problem with respect to the network externality. 
In a single period, the manufacturer sells to both retailers while competing with them in the 
market. Hence, a consumer located at x should choose to purchase online or from one retailer to 
maximise his utility. As in Liu and Zhang (2006) and Liu (2006), consumers located close to 
retailers will buy from retail stores and those located far away from retailers will choose to shop 
online. Therefore, consumer utility as a function of location x is as follows: 
V  x  p1, i  R1 
U (i; x)  
 
 (1 x)  p2, i  R2 
V   pd  s, i  M 
 
The marginal consumer who is indifferent between R1 and online is located at x1 when    V – x1 – 
p1 = V – pd – s. The consumer who is indifferent between R2 and online is located at x2 when V – 
(1 – x2) – p2 = V – pd – s. Consequently, Ri’s second stage profit is given by π(R2) = (pi – wi)(pd + 
s – pi), i = 1, 2 and both retailers’ optimal pricing in the second 
stage is pi  
1 
( pd  s  wi ), 
2 
i = 1, 2. What should be clear under this Hotelling linear
model is that when the manufacturer enters into direct internet marketing, the two retailers’ face-
to-face competition stops and they must both compete with the online 
  
 
 
store. Hence, the manufacturer’s direct entry steals away some of the neutral consumers from 
both retailers. This dynamic is similar to that in Balasubramanian’s (1998) model,  in which the 
direct channel presence is so strong that each retailer competes against the online marketer rather 
than against neighbouring retailers. The manufacturer’s payoff is π(M) = w1x1 + w2(1 – x2) + pd(x2 
– x1) – F. Because the manufacturer will only add an online selling channel if it will lead to higher 
total profits, we derive the following condition for the manufacturer opening an online channel: 
Proposition 1: When the dominant retailer dictates the wholesale price, the manufacturer 
may open an online channel only when F  
2s2  4s 1 
8 
and 0  s  
2 

2 
2 
. Once the 
online channel is added, the equilibriums are given by 
w*  w 1, p*  w  
2  s 
, p*  w  
2  s 
, 
2 1 d 1 
2 
1 1
 4
 
p*  w  
4  s 
, q 
 
 
 
2  s 
, q 
 
 
 
s 
, q 
 
  
1 s 
,
 
 
 
2 1 
4 
1 
4 
2    
4 
d
 2 
π(M )  w  
s2  2s  2 
 F , π(R )  
(2  s)2 
, π(R )  
s2
 
1 
4 
1 
16 
2     
16 
Obviously, the market share and profit of both retailers are greatly cut down, especially the weak 
retailer when it is convenient to shop online – that is, when the online shopping cost is small 
enough. The online selling price is higher than the dominant retailer’s  selling price and lower 
than weak retailer’s, which departures from the common sense that online selling price is 
generally lower. 
 
2.2.2 Two-period problem under a network externality 
As shown by Viswanathan (2005), one of the key channel parameters driven by the technological 
capabilities that differentiate online from traditional channels is the positive consumption 
externality, a factor that has major significance even when the same product or commodity is sold 
in both traditional and technology-driven channels. Adopting this same assumption with a 
primary focus on the unique features between online and offline selling, we assume that, without 
loss of generality, there are no externalities offline. In addition, because all the products sold in 
the system are the same, we, like Liu and Zhang (2006) and Balasubramanian (1998), rule out the 
trivial case of the existence of a switching cost. Table 2 summarises the new parameters. 
Table 2 Additional model parameters 
pi
j 
xi
j 
qi
j 
 
Price set by firm i in period j, i = 1, 2, d; j = 1, 2 
Marginal consumers’ location for Ri and the online channel in period j, i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2 
Market share for firm i in period j, i = 1, 2, d; j = 1, 2 
δ The degree of the network externality 
wi The wholesale price set by the manufacturer for retailers in period j, j = 1, 2 
Given an online channel-supported network externality, in the  second  period,  consumers will 
derive utility from the network of first-period online  consumers,  meaning that the surplus for 
consumers who shop online in the second period can be 
  
 
d d 
1 
2 
 
characterised by U  V  p2  s  δq1 and the value range of the network externality 
is [0, 1] (Viswanathan, 2005). Hence, when facing an externality, the manufacturer, in 
setting its price, must take into consideration not only the impact on its first-period 
demand and profitability but also the effect of its first-period demand on its second-
period demand and profits. The manufacturer must therefore choose its first-period prices 
to maximise its total profits over both periods. We thus specify first-period demand by 
first using backward induction to solve the firms’ optimal second-period prices. The 
surplus for a consumer at x who buys from R1 in the second 
period will be V  p2  x;  that for a consumer who buys from R2 in the second period 
will be V  p2  (1 x).  Therefore, in the second period, the indifferent consumer that 
purchases from R1 and M is located at x
2  p2  s  δq1  p2 , and the indifferent 
1 d d 1 
consumer that purchases from R2 and M is located at x
2  1 p2  s  δq1  p2. 
2 d d 2 
We begin by computing the second-period demand for all firms. The second-period 
objective functions for the two retailers are as follows 
π  R1   p2  w2  p2  s  δq1  p2 , i  1, 2 
i i d d i 
2 
i 
By solving the first-order conditions, we then obtain the following optimal retail prices: 
p
2
  
1 
 p2  s  δq1  w2 , i  1, 2 
 
i     
2 
d d i 
So as the manufacturer should set its first period price while taking into consideration the 
effect of its first period demand on its profitability in second period, the profit function 
across two periods of the manufacturer is given by 
π(M )  w1q1  w2q2  p1 q1  w2q2  w2q2  p2q2 
w2 , p1 
1   1 1 1 d   d 1   1 2   2 d d 
1 d 
Proposition 2: If s ≥ 1, the manufacturer will never open an online channel, but if 
s  
1 
δ, 
2 
the manufacturer will only sell through the dominant retailer and online. When 
1 
δ  s  1, 
2 
follows: 
the optimal prices and market shares for all firms in both periods are as 
p1  w1  
4  3δ  2s(1 δ) 
, p2  w2  
4  δ  2s 
, p1  w1  
4  2s  3δ 
,
 
   
d 1 
2(2  δ) 
d 1 
2(2  δ) 1
 1
 4(2  δ) 
p1  w1  
8  5δ  2s 
, p2  w2  
4  2s  3δ 
, p2  w2  
8  5δ  2s 
,
 
   
2 1 
4(2  δ) 1 1 4(2  δ) 2 1 4(2  δ) 
q1  q2  
4  2s  3δ 
, q1  q2  
1 s 
, q1  q2 
 
2s  δ 
,
 
 
1 1 
4(2  δ) 
d d     
2  δ 2 2 4(2  δ) 
Π(M )  w1  w2  
2(1 s)2  2  δ 
, Π(R )  
(4  2s  3δ)2 
, Π(R )  
(2s  δ)2 
1 1 
2(2  δ) 
1 
8(2  δ)2 
2 
8(2  δ)2 
It is readily apparent that when online shopping is sufficiently convenient (i.e., the online 
shopping cost is sufficiently low) and a dominant retailer is present, the weak retailer will 
be driven out of market. Hence, as the online network externality increases, the 
p 
  
 
 
manufacturer’s profit level rises but both retailers’ profits drop. Therefore, the online 
channel network externality will always benefit the manufacturer but hurt the retailers. 
 
 
3 Asymmetry in retailing costs 
 
With the same signification in Geylani et al. (2007), the manufacturer should recognise 
that even if retailers such as Wal-Mart benefit from operational efficiencies, their raw 
ability to dictate supply prices can be an additional factor in achieving low costs. 
Therefore, we let c1 and c2 (c2 > c1 ≥ 0) to denote the marginal costs of retailing of both 
retailers. 
 
3.1 Single period problem 
The retailers’ pricing decision is to maximise 
π  Ri    pi  wi  ci  pd  s  pi , i  1, 2 
Proposition 3: In a single period, when retailers’ operational costs are asymmetric, the 
wholesale price for the weak retailer is lower than that when retailers’ operational costs 
are symmetric while the direct online selling price is higher. The manufacturer will add 
an online channel only when 
F   
1  2 c2  c2  c1c2   6(1 s) c1  c2   6s2 12s  3

24 
1 2 
If s < c2 and the manufacturer decides to open the online channel, the weak retailer will 
be driven out of market. 
 
3.2 Two-period problem under a network externality 
With the same solution process in Section 3.2.2, we derive the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: The two period equilibriums are shown as follows. 
p1  w1  
24  3δ  2s(1 δ)  (4  3δ)c1  δc2 
, w1  1 w1  
c2  c1 ,
 
d 1 
4(2  δ) 
2 1 
2
 
w2  1 w2  
c2  c1 , p1  w1  
8  6δ  4s  (12  7δ)c1  δc2 ,
 
2 1 
2 
1 1 
8(2  δ) 
p1  w1  
16 10δ  4s  (8  5δ)c1  (4  3δ)c2 ,
 
2 1 
8(2  δ) 
p2  w2  
(4  δ)c1  δc2  8  2δ  4s , p2  w2  
8  4s  6δ  (12  7δ)c1  δc2 ,
 
d 1 
4(2  δ) 1 1 8(2  δ) 
p2  w2  
16 10δ  4s  (8  5δ)c1  (4  3δ)c2 , q1  q2  
2(1 s)  c1  c2 ,
 
2 1 
8(2  δ) d d 2(2  δ) 
q1  q2  
8  4s  6δ  (4  δ)c1  δc2 , q1  q2  
4s  2δ  δc1  (4  δ)c2  
1 1 
8(2  δ) 2 2 8(2  δ) 
  
 
 
The wholesale price for the weak retailer is higher when retailers’ cost asymmetry 
decreases. This means that when the marginal cost of the dominant retailer is given, the 
weak retailer may pay more if its marginal operation cost gets lower and less if reverse. It 
is clear from the proposition that, the situation for the weak retailer is more severe as 
when δc1 + (4 – δ)c2 > 4s – 2δ > 0, the weak retailer will be driven out of market. 
Obviously, all firms’ final equilibrium decisions are affected by the marginal operational 
costs of both retailers. The first period price of the manufacturer is increasing with c1 and 
decreasing with c2 while the second period price is increasing with c1 and c2. The retail 
prices of the dominant retailer over both periods are always increasing with c1 and 
decreasing with c2. The retail prices of the weak retailer are always increasing with c1 and 
c2 in both period. As both retailers’ marginal costs raises, due to the change of retail 
prices, more consumers will choose to shop online and less offline in either period. 
 
 
4 Channel power and channel-supported network externality 
 
Following the thought of Geylani et al. (2007), to illustrate the impact of channel power 
on pricing decisions and profits of all firms, we contrast equilibrium outcomes in two 
related models, one with a dominant retailer who can dictate favourable wholesale terms 
(which we call it AS model) and one without (which we call it S model). The AS model 
is already been analysed in sections before and we mainly show the S model in this 
section. 
First when under single period case, because the retailers are identical, the 
manufacturer will set the same wholesale price for both retailers. Consequently, both 
retailers’ second stage profit is given by π(Ri) = (pi – w)(pd + s – pi), i = 1, 2. And the 
manufacturer’s payoff is π(M) = w(x1 + 1 – x2) + pd(x2 – x1) – F. With same solution 
process as in Liu and Zhang (2006), we then derive the following proposition: 
Proposition 5: In a single period, the manufacturer will open an online channel only 
when F  
(2  s)2 
,
 
4 
and once it is opened, the manufacturer will expropriate the online 
consumer total surplus by setting the highest direct selling price. Equilibrium is thus 
characterised by 
w*  V  
s 
, p*  V  s, p*  p*  V  
s 
, q  q 
 
  
 
s 
, q 
 
  
2  s 
,
 
 
 
2 
d 1 2 
4 
1 2    
4 
d
 2
 
π(M )  V  s  
s2 
 F , π  R   π  R   
s2
 
4 
1 2      
16 
Obviously, when an online channel is opened, the manufacturer will set the online selling 
price lower than its wholesale prices or the retail prices, meaning that the wholesale price 
will be higher than when no online channel has been opened. Hence, the direct internet 
entry seriously hurts the retailers that must follow suit. If it is convenient to shop online – 
that is, when the online shopping cost is small enough – the number of online shoppers is 
much greater than the number of those buying offline, so the manufacturer’s willingness 
to sell online is much higher even when the utility of all consumers purchasing online is 
zero. 
  
 
 
Second, when facing an online channel-supported network externality, by using 
backward induction, we thus derive the following propositions: 
Proposition 6: If s < δ, no unique equilibrium exists for this sub-game. When s > δ, 
however, the optimal prices and market shares for the manufacturer and retailers in both 
periods are given by 
w1  w2  V  
s  δ 
, p1  V  s, 
 
2  δ d 
p2  V  
2(s  δ) 
, p1  p1  p2  p2  V 

s  δ 
,
 
 
d 
2  δ 
1 2 1 2 
2(2  δ) 
q1  q2  
2  s 
, q1  q2  q1  q2 

s  δ 
,
 
 
d d 
2  δ 
1 1 2 2 
2(2  δ) 
Π(M )  2V  
4s  s2  2δ 
, Π R   Π R  


(s  δ)2 
 
 
2  δ 
1 2 
2(2  δ)2 
Obviously, when both retailers are identical, there is no change in market share across 
periods for any firm; however, in the second period, the manufacturer’s online selling 
price increases because of the network externality. In such circumstances, the network 
externality benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailers because as the degree of 
network externality increases, the manufacturer’s profit level rises but the retailers’ profit 
level declines. 
To better illustrate the impact of channel power on  the  manufacturer’s  internet 
entry, we present a comparative analysis here. All firms’ equilibriums are presented in 
Appendix Table A1. For ease of comparison, we let the wholesale price set by the 
dominant retailer for the manufacturer in both periods equal w1. We show the impact of 
channel power by comparing the equilibriums under the S model with those under the AS 
model in both the single-period and two-period cases and then assess the impact of the 
network externality by comparing the single-period equilibriums with the two-period 
equilibriums under both models. 
 
4.1 Channel power 
An analysis of outcomes reveals that when no network externality is considered, a 
comparison of the single-period equilibriums under the S model with those under the AS 
model reveals no change in the market share and profit level of R2. However, under the 
AS model, as compared to the S model, if Retailer 1 has the dominant pressure over the 
manufacturer, the retail prices of both retailers decrease and the market share and profit 
level of R1 increase. When a network externality is taken into account, however, a 
comparison of the two-period equilibriums under the S and AS models clearly shows that 
the retail prices of both retailers decrease and that the market share and profits of both 
retailers increase if Retailer 1 is the dominant retailer. In either model, the manufacturer’s 
direct selling price is higher when an online channel network externality is taken into 
account; however, in the presence of a dominant retailer, the manufacturer’s profit is 
always less whether or not a network externality is considered. 
  
 
 
4.2 Channel-supported network externality 
When the manufacturer has absolute control over its wholesale prices, given the presence 
of an online channel network externality, then, compared to the single-period case, the 
market shares and profits of both retailers decrease while those of the manufacturer 
increase. Even when the online consumption surplus is zero, more consumers will choose 
to shop online in the expectation of an online channel network externality. Hence, even 
though an online channel network externality that benefits the manufacturer seemingly 
hurts retailers, the expectation of an online channel network externality, in contrast to the 
findings by Viswanathan (2005), leads retailers to set a higher retail price in both periods. 
Additionally, under the AS model, when the manufacturer is facing a dominant retailer, 
in the single period, this retailer dominates more than half the market because its retail 
price is much lower than under the S model and this abstraction of such a low price 
increases consumer willingness to buy from this retailer. As a result, the manufacturer’s 
market share is lower than under the S model no matter whether the online channel does 
or does not provide a network externality. When all firms expect a network externality, 
retailers set their retail prices lower in both periods than in the single period to compete 
for consumers. 
 
 
5 Consumer welfare 
 
We first show the impact of a manufacturer’s direct entry when a positive  online  
channel network externality is considered under the S model. Before this direct entry, the 
consumer surplus can be directly calculated to equal 
1 
; 
4 
afterwards, the consumer total 
surplus  is 
s2
 
16 
in the single-period case, but the consumer surplus per period lowers to 
(s  δ)2 
4(2  δ)2 
in the two-period case. This observation leads directly to the conclusion that 
when the two retailers are symmetric, the manufacturer’s direct online entry greatly 
reduces consumer welfare.  Hence,  although  a  network  externality  seems  to  add  
more utility for consumers in the second period, consumers are hurt more by the channel-
supported network effect when the manufacturer has absolute control over its wholesale 
prices. This negative outcome stems primarily from two factors: first, the manufacturer 
will always exploit the highest consumer surplus from the online channel and second, 
retailers’ prices are higher given the expectation of an online channel network externality. 
Under the  AS  model,  in  which  the  dominant  retailer  dictates  its  wholesale  
price to the manufacturer, after the manufacturer’s direct online entry, the consumer 
total surplus per period is V  w  
14  6s  s2 in the single period case and 
1 
 
V  w  
56  24s  68δ  8sδ 19δ2  4s2 
16 
in the two-period case. Hence, in the presence 
1 
16(2  δ)2 
of a dominant retailer, the consumer surplus per period is higher in the two-period case 
  
 
 
than in the single-period case. In contrast to the outcome under the S model, therefore, 
consumers do benefit from the online channel-supported network externality. 
These comparisons clearly show that in the presence of a dominant retailer with a low 
retail price, the consumer total surplus is always higher under the AS model than under 
the S model. Similarly, given the expectation of an online channel network externality, 
the consumer surplus is higher in the first period than in the second period and consumers 
do benefit from the network effect. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we extend Geylani et al.’s (2007) work by analysing a situation in which 
the manufacturer can add a direct online selling channel to improve its profit level to 
suggest that online expansion could also be a kind of strategic manufacturer’s optimal 
response to a dominant retailer Most particularly, we consider the existence of a channel- 
supported network externality in the online channel and provide a decision-making aid 
for the manufacturer and its retailers. 
We find that when the manufacturer has absolute control over its wholesale prices, it 
will expropriate the online consumers’ total surplus and that even when the net utility is 
zero, some consumers will still choose to shop online. Under this symmetric case, 
compared with the single-period retail price, both retailers will set a higher retail price 
across the two periods. Nevertheless, because the online selling price set by the 
manufacturer is lower than the retailers’ prices, when it is profitable for the manufacturer 
to add an online selling channel, these two retailers suffer lower profits regardless of 
whether they are symmetric or asymmetric. When both retailers are symmetric, the 
unique features offered by the web channels (i.e., the network externality) may hurt 
consumers; however, consumers do benefit from the presence of a dominant retailer. As 
the degree of the network externality increases, it benefits the manufacturer but hurts the 
retailers. We find that when the fixed cost of setting up an online channel and consumers’ 
shopping cost online are not high, the setup of an online channel is always profitable for 
the manufacturer to deal with the dominant retailer’s aggressive wholesale price 
squeezing, especially when the online channel related network externality is present. But 
when consumers’ online shopping cost is too high, the manufacturer will never open an 
online channel. 
One possible direction for future research would be to better understand the 
competition among different manufacturers because such competition may significantly 
impact the strategic decisions of channel members. Another possible avenue – and one 
that would move beyond our primary focus on the manufacturer’s perspective – would be 
to investigate the reactions of other channel members to a manufacturer’s direct online 
entry and whether, in the presence of a dominant retailer, the manufacturer and retailers 
bargain over channel profits. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
When no online selling channel has been opened, the manufacturer’s profit, as shown by 
Geylani et al. (2007), is w1  
3 
. If an online channel is open, the profit function of R1 is 
8 
π(R1) = (p1 – w1)(pd + s – p1) and that of R2 is π(R2) = (p2 – w2)(pd + s – p2). Solving the 
first-order conditions yields p1  
1 
( pd  s  w1) 
2 
and p2  
1 
( pd  s  w2). 
2 
Substituting 
back into the manufacturer’s profit function, we then obtain 
π(M )  
1 
w1  pd  s  w1  
1 
w2  pd  s  w2   pd 

1 pd  s  
w1  w2  
, 
2 2 
 
2 


w2 , pd 
 
which easily leads to 
 
w2  w1 1, pd  w1  
2  s 
. 
2 
 

The manufacturer’s profit is then 
π(M )  w  
2  2s  s2 
 F , 
 
 
so compared to the situation in which there is no online 
1 
4
 
 
channel, the manufacturer will open an online channel only when F  
2s2  4s 1
.
 
8 
 
Although when 
2  2 
 s  2, 
2 
 
the profit of the manufacturer if adding an online 
channel is higher then when the online channel has not been opened, the manufacturer’s 
market share online is negative. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
In the event that the manufacturer is unable to dictate its wholesale price to the dominant 
retailer and can only control 2 and p2 , substituting the optimal retail prices of both 
retailers into the manufacturer’s objective function yields 
π 2(M )  
1 
w
2
  p2  s  δq1  w2   
1 
w
2
  p2  s  δq1  w2 
 1 d d 1 2 d d 2 
w2 , p2      2 2 
2 d 
 2 
 1 2 1 2     1 2 1 2 

p 1

 pd  s  δqd  w1  
2 2 
 pd  s  δqd  w2 
w 
  
 
2 1 
d 

 


By   solving   the   first-order   conditions,   we  then  obtain p2  
1 
(2w2  2  s  δq1 ), 
 
d     
2 
1 d 
w2  w2 1. 
The total profit over two periods for the manufacturer is: 
π(M )  
1 
w
1
  p1  s  w1  
1 
w
1
  p1  s  w1   p1 1  p1  s  
1 
w
1
  
1 
w
1
 


1 d 1 2 d 
2 d  d 
1 2 
w1 , p1      2 2  2 2 
2 d 
 
1 2 


 1 1 1 
 
 
1 1 

2 
w1 1 s  δ 1 pd  s  w1  w2 
  2 2 
 
1  
s  
 
 p1  s  
1 
w1  
1 
w1 


4 
 δ 1 d 1 2 
  2 2 
 
1  
2w2  2  s  
 
 p1  s  
1 
w1  
1 
w1 


4 
 1 
δ 1 d 
1 2 

1 s  



1 
1 
1 
 
 
2 2 
1 1 

δ 1 p  s 
  2 
w1  
2
 w2 

After computing first order condition, the optimal first period wholesale price for  
Retailer 2 and direct selling price online are given by: 
w1  w1 1, p1  w1  
4  3δ  2s(1 δ) 
.
 
 
2 1 d 1 
2(2  δ) 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The retailers’ optimal retail prices are: 
 
pi  
1 
 pd  s  wi  ci , i  1, 2 
2 
By substituting them back into manufacturer’s profit function, we derive: 
π(M )  
1 
w1  pd  s  w1  c1  
1 
w2  pd  s  w2  c2 
w2 , pd 2 2 
 pd 

1 pd  s  
1 
 w1  c1  w2  c2 



 2 
After first order condition, the wholesale price for Retailer 2 and the online selling price 
are given by: 
pd  w1  
1 
c1  
2  s 
 w1  
2  s 
, w2  w1 1  
1 
c2  c1   w1 1 
2 2 2 2 
Therefore, the maximised profit of the manufacturer is: 
w  
1 c  s2  c  s2  4(1  s)  4c   F. 
1    
8 
1 2 1 
  
 


 
With the same solution process, the manufacturer’s profit without internet entry is 
w  
(3  c2  c1)
2 
.
 
1 
24 
The market share of the weak retailer when manufacturer decides to open online 
channel is 
s  c2 
. So when s < c2, the weak retailer will be driven out of market. 
4 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
The computing process is the same as that in the proof of Proposition 2. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Before the manufacturer opens the online channel, because the two retailers are identical, 
their retail prices and market share are the same. The marginal consumer, obviously, is 
located at the middle of the line; the left-side consumers will buy from R1, and the right-
side consumers will buy from R2. R1 will set its retail price so that V – x – p1 = 0, which 
allows us to derive the profit function of R1: π(R1) = (p1 – w)(V – p1). By 
solving the first-order condition, we obtain an optimal value of p1: p1  
1 
(V  w). Then 
2 
x  
1 
(V  w), 
2 
π(M) = w(V – w), with the first-order condition that w  
1 
V , x  
V 
 
1 
. 
2 4 2 
Given V > 4, the manufacturer will set its wholesale price to ensure that the retailers just 
cover the market; that is, x  
1 
. It will thus set w = V – 1 and π(M) = V – 1. 
2 
After the manufacturer has opened the online channel,  if  it  sets  the  wholesale  
price to w ≥ V, the retailers cannot make  any  sale  profitably  and  the  manufacturer  
will only sell online. Then the manufacturer’s profit is π(M) = V – s – F. If w < V, 
meaning that, as shown above, p1  p2  
1 
( pd  s  w), 
2 
the manufacturer’s payoff is 
π(M) = w(pd + s – w) + pd(1 – pd – s + w), and its optimal direct selling price is 
pd  
1 
(1 s  2w).  Because pd ≤ V – s, we must have w  V  
1 
(1 s). Therefore, when 
2 2 
V  
1 
(1 s)  w  V , the online selling price is always pd = V – s, and the manufacturer’s 
2 
profit can be summarised as follows: 

w  
(1 s)2 
 F ,
 
 
 
if 0  w  V  
1 
(1  s) 
 
 
 
4 2 
π(M )  

w2  (2V  s)w  (V  s)(V 1)  F , 

V  s  F , 
if V  
1 
(1  s)  w  V 
2 
if w  V 
The equilibrium in this sub-game is therefore given by 
  
 
d d d d d 
d 
d d 
d 
 
w  V  
1 
s, p  V  s, p  p  V  
s 
, π(M )  V  s  
s2 
 F 
2 
d 1 2 
4 4 
Comparing the manufacturer’s profit when the online channel is opened versus when it is 
not, the difference is Δπ(M )  1 s  
s2 
 F. Hence, when Δπ(M) > 0, the manufacturer 
4 
will open an online channel. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
The second-period objective functions for the two retailers are π(R1)  ( p
2  w2)( p
2  s 
1 d 
2 
1 
δq1  p2 ) and π(R2)  ( p
2  w2)( p
2  s  δq1  p2 ) respectively. After solving the 
d 1 2 
2 
2 
d d 2 
first-order condition, we get 
p2  p2  
1  p2  s  δq1  w2 , x2  1 x2  
1  p2  s  δq1  w2 . 
  
1 2     
2 
d d 1 2     
2 
d d 
Substituting this solution into the manufacturer’s objective function yields 
π(M )  w2  p2  s  δq1  w2   p2 1 p2  s  δq1  w2 
w2 , p
2
 
 
Because it is impossible to derive an optimal first-order condition for the  above  
function,   however,   we   discuss   the   manufacturer’s   second-period   profit   in   
terms of the alteration in its wholesale price. First, its optimal online selling 
price is p
2  
1 
(1 s  2w2  δq
1 ), so, because p2  V  s  δq1 , 
 
we have w2  V 
d     
2 
d d d 
 
1 
(1 s  δq1 ). When V  
1 
(1 s  δq1 )  w2  V , then the optimal online selling price 
  
2 
d 
2 
d 
is p2  V  s  δq1 , and if w2 > V, the manufacturer will only sell online. The sub-game 
can thus be summarised as 
 1 s  δq1 2  1 
w2 
d , if w2  V  (1 s  δq
1 ) 
 4 2 

π(M ) 
2 1 1 
1 
1 
 
 w2 2V  s  δqd  w2 V  s  δqd (V 1), if V 

2 
(1 s  δqd )  w2 V V  s  δq1 , if w2  V 
 d 
and its equilibrium is given by 
w2  V  
1 
s  
1 
δq1 , p2  V  s  δq1 , p2  p2  
1  
2V  
1 
s  
1 
δq1 

. 
2 2 
d d d 1 2 
2 
 2 2 d 


 
p 
p 
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
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Cases and Two-period equilibriums 
equilibriums  in the S model 
Two-period equilibriums 
in the S model 
Single-period equilibriums 
in the AS model 
Two-period equilibriums 
in the AS model 
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